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Abstract
We consider a continuous time Principal-Agent model on a finite time horizon,
where we look for the existence of an optimal contract both parties agreed on.
Contrary to the main stream, where the principal is modelled as risk-neutral, we
assume that both the principal and the agent have exponential utility, and are risk
averse with same risk awareness level. Moreover, the agent’s quality is unknown
and modeled as a filtering term in the problem, which is revealed as time passes
by. The principal can not observe the agent’s real action, but can only recommend
action levels to the agent. Hence, we have a moral hazard problem. In this setting,
we give an explicit solution to the optimal contract problem.
Keywords: dynamic principal agent problem, moral hazard, optimal control.
1 Introduction
We consider optimal contracting between two parties, principal (“she”) and agent (“he”)
in continuous time, when agent’s actual effort can not be observed by the principal. In
economics, this type of problems is called “hidden action” or “moral hazard” problem,
where the agent’s control of the drift of the output process can not be contracted upon.
To give an example for the moral hazard problem, we can consider a scenario, where
the investor (“principal) hires a portfolio manager (“agent”) to manage her savings. The
investor can not observe the actual effort (or action) of the portfolio manager but only
1
2the current wealth of the portfolio. Hence, in case the investor is not satisfied about the
performance of the portfolio manager, the manager could blame the market and argue he
gave the best performance for her savings, since the investor can not observe the actual
efforts of her portfolio manager, anyway.
The seminal paper on the continuous time principal-agent problem is [9], where both
parties have exponential utilities and agree on a linear optimal contract. Their results
are generalized and extended by several authors, ( see e.g. [15, 16, 8, 6, 5, 11, 12] among
others). A nice survey of the literature is provided by Sung in [18]. Recently, [3] has
considered a general formulation of the principal-agent problem with a lump-sum pay-
ment on a finite horizon, where the agent influences both the agent and the volatility of
the output, where the proofs use techniques based on Backward Stochastic Differential
Equations approach to non-Markovian stochastic control.
In another seminal paper, [14] works in continuous time moral hazard model with
infinite horizon and the payments are paid continuously, rather than as a lump sum
payment at the terminal time. In [14], the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk
averse and the agent only controls the drift of the output. [13] extends [14] to the case
of unobserved drift and makes use of the Stochastic Maximum Principle. [20] solves a
principal-agent moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the agent are risk
averse, the payments are continuous, and the agent controls the unobserved drift term
of the output. The main difference in the contract between a model with a risk averse
and a risk neutral principal is whether there is an ongoing consumption and dividends,
as would be the case with a risk aversion, or only “lumpy” consumption and dividends
which would be the case with risk-neutrality. While most of the literature focuses on a
risk neutral principal, there are exceptions like the seminal work [9] and the recent work
[20]. The current manuscript is another work in this direction with a risk averse principal.
In this paper, we solve a moral hazard problem in continuous time Brownian model,
where there is an additional endogenous learning term representing agent’s unknown
quality added to the model. To represent unknown quality of the agent, we follow the
framework introduced in [13]. However, we do not assume that the principal is risk-neutral
as in [13], but instead both the principal and the agent have exponential utility with same
risk-awareness level as in [20]. Our model is both quantitatively and qualitatively different
from the one in [13] and from [20]. In the risk neutral case as in [13], contracting is
profitable, because the principal can extract profits by providing insurance to the agent.
In our case, combined with the unknown quality of the agent, the interaction is more
complicated. We can not conclude directly that the economic benefits will decrease as
the difference in risk aversion between the principal and the agent shrinks, since we
3don’t know the quality of the agent a priori, but his quality is revealed with time. The
same obstacle has been observed in [13], where their results hold conditioned enough
time has passed to conclude qualitative results about the model. In our model, we see
that as the unknown quality of the agent is revealed with time such that it does not
affect the model significantly, our model converges to the analogous findings without the
parameter uncertainty. On the other hand, even though the risk awareness if the principal
is taken into consideration in [20], there is no endogenous learning term, hence there are
no aforementioned complications related to it. Furthermore, we also show that both
parties agree on a contract, where the agent gives full effort from the beginning of the
contract until the horizon T . Hence, neither the risk awareness of the principal nor the
unknown quality of the agent do not affect the agent’s actual effort level given throughout
the model, even though the principal can not observe it, which was to be observed in [13],
whereas [20] focused on interior optimal efforts.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we outline the general model of the
problem. In Section 3, we describe the agent’s problem and find the dynamics of the
continuation value function of the agent. In Section 4, we solve the principal’s optimal
control problem, describe the optimal contract, and in Section 5 we further discuss and
elaborate our main results and conclude the paper.
2 The Model
In this section, we give the framework and dynamics of the model. Let {Wt}t≥0 be a
standard Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ft is generated by the
Brownian motion Wt. As in [13], we assume that the cumulative output yt up to time T
satisfies the stochastic integral equation
yt =
∫ t
0
(
η + as
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σdWs, (2.1)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where η stands for the quality of the agent and is denoted by η, and
at ∈ [0,M ] for 0 ≤ t ≤ T is the effort provided by the agent. η is unknown and we
model it as in [13] with the common prior being normal with mean m0 and precision h0.
Posterior over η, denoted by ηˆ, depends on yt and on cumulative effort At ,
∫ t
0
asds.
4Conditional on (yt, At, t), posterior belief about η is also normal with
ηˆ(yt −At, t) , Et[η|yt, At] (2.2)
ηˆ(yt −At, t) ,
h0m0 + σ
−2(yt − At)
ht
ht , h0 + σ
−2t
ηˆ(0, 0) = m0.
The principal does not observe the agent’s effort, but can only recommend actions ˆ¯a. We
denote the filtration generated by output and recommended actions (y¯, ˆ¯a) as
Fyt , σ(ys, ˆ¯as; 0 ≤ s ≤ t) (2.3)
and Fy , {Fyt }t≥0, the P-augmentation of this filtration. As in [13], we take the utility
function of the agent with λ ∈ (0, 1), θ > 0 as
u(w, a) = −e−θw+θλa (2.4)
and actions of the agent are limited in a compact set at ∈ [0,M ] for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . On the
other hand, the agent knows the actual level of effort a¯, which only he knows. Hence,
the agent’s information is more than the principal. We denote the filtration generated by
output, recommended actions and actual actions up to time t as (y¯, a¯∗) as
Fat , σ(ys, a¯s, a¯
∗; 0 ≤ s ≤ t) (2.5)
and Fa , {Fat }0≤t≤T , the P-augmentation of this filtration. The agent is restricted to the
class of control processes A , {at : [0, T ]×Ω→ [0,M ]} that are F
a-predictable. We work
with the induced distributions on the space of continuous functions. We take the sample
space Ω to be the space of all continuous paths C[0, T ] equipped with the supremum
norm ‖·‖∞. On C[0, T ], we let W
0
t = ω(t) be the family of coordinate functions and
F0t = σ{W
0
s , s ≤ t} the filtration generated by W
0
t . We denote by P
0 the corresponding
Wiener measure on (Ω,F0t ) and let Ft be the completion with the null sets of F
0
T . On
this space, we define the corresponding Brownian motion W 0t as in Equation (2.1). The
set of admissible contracts C is the set of FY , {FYt }0≤t≤T predictable functions (at, wt) :
[0, T ]×Y → A×W . Hence, the contract specifies a wage w¯t and a recommended action a¯t
at date t that depend on the whole past history of the output y¯t. Then, given a contract,
the agent takes his own choice of action at at each time t. Thus, the set of admissible
actions A for the agent are those Fat -predictable functions (a¯, w¯) : [0, T ]× Y → A×W .
5Definition 2.1. A contract is called implementable if the agent agrees to the contract at
time zero and chooses the recommended actions: (a∗, w∗) = (a¯, w¯).
The dependence on the whole past implies that we can not use a direct approach to
the agent’s problem, since the entire past history y¯ would be a state variable. To overcome
this difficulty, we make the problem tractable as in [1, 2],[6], [20] by taking the key state
variable to be the density of the output process rather than the output process itself. By
considering different action choices corresponding to different output processes, we take
the relative density process Γt, as defined in Equation (3.10). For σ > 0, we define
dyt = σdW
0
t , (2.6)
where y0 is given. This is the evolution of output under an effort policy a¯
0, which makes
the drift of output equal to zero at each time t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, different effort choices
alter the evolution of output by changing the distribution over outcomes in y with their
corresponding Γt.
3 The Agent’s Problem
We impose a terminal date T on the contracting horizon. Until time T , both the principal
and the agent are committed to the contract. To have an incentive compatible contract,
we need to specify what action the agent would choose when facing a given contract.
First, we assume the following assumption. The agent’s continuation value is
v(a, t) , E
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(ws, as)ds+ e
−ρ(T−t)g(wT )|F
a
t
]
, (3.7)
where y¯t , {ys; 0 ≤ s ≤ t} is the output history, ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant discount rate
and the functions u and g are defined to be below. The history dependence on the past
makes it necessary to change the relevant state variable. We denote
f(t, y¯, at) = ηˆ(yt − At, t) + at, (3.8)
where
At =
∫ t
0
asds, (3.9)
here we recall that y¯t means y depends on the whole path. We denote the density de-
pending on action a¯ of Ft-predictable processes:
Γt(a¯) = exp
( ∫ t
0
σ−1f(s, y¯, as)dW
0
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
|σ−1f(s, y¯, as)|
2ds
)
, (3.10)
6where W 0t is as defined in Equation (2.6). Γt is an Ft-martingale (as the assumptions on
f ensures that Novikov’s condition is satisfied) with E[ΓT (a¯)] = 1 for all a¯ ∈ A where
A stands for the set of admissible actions. Thus, by Girsanov theorem, we define a new
measure P a¯ via:
dP a¯
dP 0
= ΓT (a¯), (3.11)
and by the filtering theorem of Fujisaki [7], the process W a¯t is defined by
W a¯t =W
0
t −
∫ t
0
σ¯−1f(s, y¯, as)ds (3.12)
is a Brownian motion under Pa¯. Thus we have
dyt = σdW
0
t (3.13)
= σ[dW a¯t + σ
−1f(t, y¯, at)dt] (3.14)
= f(t, y¯, at)dt+ σdW
a¯
t (3.15)
Hence each effort choice a¯ results in a different Brownian motion W at . Γt defined above
satisfies Γt = E[ΓT |F
a¯
t ]. Moreover, via derivation as in [13] by Ito lemma we have ηˆ is a
P a¯-martingale with decreasing variance
dηˆ(yt − At, t) =
σ−1
ht
dW a¯t (3.16)
Using the state variable as the density process Γt, we rewrite the optimization problem
as
v(a, t) = E0t
[ ∫ T
t
Γas,Te
−ρ(s−t)u(ws), as)ds+ e
−ρ(T−t)g(wT )|F
0
t
]
, (3.17)
where the terminal value function being g(wT ) = −e
1−ρ
r
−λθrwT of the agent is to be derived
below. This approach makes our optimization problem as tractable with optimal control
techniques. The agent’s problem then is to solve
v∗(t) = sup
a¯∈A
v(a¯, w¯). (3.18)
Theorem 3.1. For each fixed action process a(·), there exists a unique decomposition for
the agent’s continuation value Equation (3.7) that satisfies
dvt = [ρvt − u(wt, at)]dt+ σγ
a
t dW
a¯
t (3.19)
vT = g(wT ), (3.20)
for some square integrable process γat , namely E
a[
∫ T
0
(γat )
2dt] < ∞. The process γat is
denoted as “incentive compatibility parameter” in moral hazard literature (see e.g. [4]).
7Proof. Recall for each action a we have for that action a
v(a, t) = Eat
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(ws, as)ds+ e
−ρ(T−t)g(wT )|F
a
t
]
(3.21)
= eρtEat
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρsu(ws, as)ds+ e
−ρ(T−t)g(wT ))|F
a
t
]
− eρt
∫ t
0
e−ρsu(ws, as)ds
dv(a, t) = ρvtdt+ γ
a
t σdW
a
t − u(wt, at)dt,
where we appeal to the Martingale representation theorem by Fujisaki [7] for square
integrable martingales. We note here that
E
a
t
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρ(s−t)u(ws, as)ds+ e
−ρ(T−t)g(wT )|F
a
t
]
, (3.22)
is a square integrable martingale since the functions g(·), u(·, ·) are bounded for a ∈ [0,M ]
and t ∈ [0, T ]. 
Next, we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions to maximize the value func-
tion of the agent in Equation (3.7). Our result is analogous to Proposition 4 in [13].
Lemma 3.2. Maximizing the Hamiltonian defined as
H(t, y, a, A, γ) , u(wt, at) + γ(ηˆ(At, y) + at) (3.23)
is sufficient for the agent to maximize his value function as in Equation (3.7). Further-
more, it is necessary for the incentive compatibility parameter γat to satisfy
γat (a, w) = −ua(wt, a
∗
t ) +
σ−2
ht
pt, (3.24)
where the term pt is as defined in Equation (3.31).
Proof. By integrating Equation (3.19) for the optimal action aˆ and for any other action
a¯, we have
e−ρTv(T ) = e−ρTg(wT ) = e
−ρtv(t, aˆ)−
∫ T
t
e−ρsu(ws, aˆs)ds+
∫ T
t
ζˆsσdW
aˆ
s
e−ρTv(T ) = e−ρTg(wT ) = e
−ρtv(t, a¯)−
∫ T
t
e−ρsu(ws, a¯s)ds+
∫ T
t
ζ¯sσdW
a¯
s , (3.25)
8where ζt , e
−ρtγt. Moreover, we have
dyt = σdW
0
t
dW aˆt = dW
0
t −
1
σ
(ηˆ(yt − Aˆt, t) + aˆt)dt
dW a¯t = dW
0
t −
1
σ
(ηˆ(yt − A¯t, t) + a¯t)dt
dW aˆt = dW
a¯
t +
1
σ
[η˜(yt − A¯, t) + a¯t − η˜(yt − Aˆ, t)− aˆt]dt (3.26)
Hence, the following holds
v(t, a¯)− v(t, aˆ) = eρtEa¯
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)[u(wt, a¯t)− u(wt, aˆt)]dt+
+
∫ T
t
γˆtσdW
a¯
t
+
∫ T
t
γˆ(a¯t − aˆt + η˜(yt, A¯t)− η˜t(yt, Aˆt))dt
]
= eρtEa¯
[ ∫ T
t
[H(a¯, γˆ)−H(aˆ, γˆ)]dt +
∫ T
t
γˆtσdW
a¯
t
≤ eρtEa¯
[ ∫ T
t
γˆtσdW
a¯
t
]
= 0. (3.27)
The last term is a martingale due to square integrability of γˆt and a ∈ [0,M ] being
bounded. Hence, we have proved the sufficient condition for the agent. Next, we prove
the necessary condition for the agent’s value function in Equation (3.7).
a˜ǫt , at + ǫ∆at
∇vt(a) , lim
ǫ→0
vt(a˜)− vt(a)
ǫ
and by small perturbation, we have
e−ρt∇vt(a) = e
−ρt lim
ǫ→0
1
ǫ
Ea˜
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρs[u(w, a˜ǫ)− u(w, a)]ds
+
∫ T
t
ζˆsdW
a¯ǫ
s +
∫ T
t
ζˆ(a˜ǫ − a + ηˆ(ys, A
ǫ
s)− ηˆ(ys, As))ds
]
, (3.28)
which gives the condition
Ea˜
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρsua∆as + ζs
(
∆as −
σ−2
hs
∫ s
t
∆ardr
)]
≤ 0, (3.29)
9Integrating by parts, we get that
Ea˜
[ ∫ T
t
(
e−ρsua + ζs −
∫ T
s
ζr
σ−2
hr
dr
)
∆asds
]
≤ 0,
By noting that ∆as is arbitrary, we get(
E
a
t
[ ∫ T
t
−ζs
σ−2
hs
ds
]
+ ζt + e
−ρsua(ws, as)
)
(at − a
∗
t ) ≤ 0 (3.30)
By focusing only at time t and using ∆at is arbitrary, we conclude that for
at ∈ [0,M ], we have
ζt + e
−ρtua(wt, a
∗
t )−
σ−2
ht
pt ≥ 0, (3.31)
where
pt = htE
[
−
∫ T
t
ζs
1
hs
ds
∣∣∣∣Fat
]
. (3.32)
Since increasing γat causes the volatility of the output to increase in Equation (3.19),
the principal wants to minimize the incentive compatibility parameter γat . Hence, by
multiplying the equation by eρt in Equation (3.31), we assume that the principal confines
with
γat (a, w) = −ua(wt, a
∗
t ) +
σ−2
ht
pt, (3.33)
and conclude the result. 
We rewrite the term pt in Equation (3.31) in a more tractable way as in [13] as follows.
First, we denote
p˜t ,
σ−2
ht
pt
Then, we have
p˜t = E
[
−
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)ζs
σ−2
hs
ds
]
,
By differentiating with respect to time t, we get
dp˜t
dt
= ρp˜t +
σ−2
ht
γt
= ρp˜t −
σ−2
ht
(ua(wt, at) + p˜t),
Integrating this expression, we obtain
p˜t =
σ−2
ht
Ea
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)ua(ws, as)ds
]
(3.34)
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Remark 3.3. By the above derivation we see that γt(w, a) is bounded by wage process wt
being non-negative and a ∈ [0,M ]. Furthermore, we also note that when there is no term
pt in Equation (3.33), we have γt = −ua, which corresponds to the first order condition
with respect to a of the term
H˜(t, y, a, γ) = u(w, a) + γtat, (3.35)
the Hamiltonian term without the filtering term in the model Equation (2.1).
For the terminal date, we assume that from date T on the unknown filtering term ηˆ is
revealed, no more production takes place and both the principal and agent live off their
assets for the infinite future, earning the same constant rate of return r. We assume both
the principal and the agent solve the problem of the following form
VT (a0) = max
bt
−
∫ ∞
0
exp(−ρt− λθbt)dt
= max
bt
−
∫ ∞
T
exp(−ρ(t− T )− λθbt)dt, (3.36)
with c0 given and dct = (rct − bt)dt. For the agent bt = wt and a0 = wT . The Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for (3.36) reads as
ρVT (a) = max
b
{− exp(−λθb) + V ′T (c)[rc− b]}, (3.37)
whose solution is
VT (c) = − exp
(1− ρ
r
− λθrc
)
,
with optimal
b(c) =
ρ− 1
λθr
+ rc.
Hence, we have for the terminal time T , the agent’s and principal’s terminal value function
vT and V
p
T as
g(wT ) = − exp
(1− ρ
r
− λθrwT
)
(3.38)
vT = g(wT ) (3.39)
V
p
T = g(yT − wT ). (3.40)
4 Principal’s Problem
From the principals point of view, the dynamics of the output follows
dyt = (ryt + ηˆ + at − dt)dt+ σdW
a
t . (4.41)
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We assume there is a common risk aversion λ between the principal and the agent. The
principal discounts at the same rate ρ with the agent and has a flow utility
U(dt) = − exp(−λθdt) (4.42)
over his consumption dt with the value function
J(t, y, v, ηˆ) = max
d,w,a
E
a
t
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)U(ds)ds+ e
−ρ(T−t)V
p
T (yT − wT )|F
a
t
]
, (4.43)
where V pT (yT − wT ) is defined as follows.
V
p
T (yT − wT ) = − exp
(1− ρ
r
− λθr(yT − wT )
)
= − exp
(1− ρ
r
− λθryT
)
exp(λθrwT ),
Using the terminal value of the agent at time T , the principal value function at time T
reads as using Equation (3.38)
vT = − exp
(1− ρ
r
− λθrwT
)
J(T, yT , vT ) = −
exp2(1−ρ
r
)
vT
exp(−λθryT )
For convenience, we summarize the value function dynamics of the principal as follows:
dηˆ =
σ−1
ht
dW at (4.44)
ηˆ(yt − At, t) =
h0m0 + σ
−2(yt −At)
ht
(4.45)
η(0, 0) = m0 (4.46)
dvt = [ρvt − u(wt, at)]dt+ σγ
a
t (a, w)dW
a
t (4.47)
vT = − exp
(1− ρ
r
)
exp(−λθrwT ) (4.48)
dyt =
(
ryt + ηˆ + at − dt
)
dt+ σdW at (4.49)
y0 = 0 (4.50)
We define the controlled value function for fixed admissible action process at as
Ju(t, v, y, ηˆ) = Eat,T [
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)e−λθdsds+ V pT (yT − wT )|F
a
t ] (4.51)
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and the value function of the control problem given (t, ηˆ, v, y) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 as,
J(t, ηˆ, v, y) := sup
a(·)∈A
Ja(t, ηˆ, v, y) (4.52)
We next state our main theorem in this section and prove it in the subsection below,
subsequently.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that the principal and the agent with an unknown quality term
have the value functions Equation (4.44) and Equation (3.7), respectively, then a contract
is implementable in the sense of Definition 2.1, where both parties agree to recommend
and give full effort for all times 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
To prove Theorem 4.1, we guess an explicit solution for the value function in Equation
(4.52) and verify our guess subsequently. Next, we guess that for 0 ≤ t ≤ T the value
function of the principal is a C1,2 function of the form
J(t, y, v, ηˆ) =
eg(t,ηˆ)
v
exp(−λθry) (4.53)
and verify its validity below. We further guess that for the optimal action process a∗t
e−θw+θλa
∗
t = k(t, ηˆ)v (4.54)
Then by Theorem 3.1, we have that
dpt = θλdvt (4.55)
pt = θλE
a
[ ∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)uds
]
(4.56)
pt = θλ[1− e
∫ T
t
(ρ−k(s,η))ds]vt (4.57)
ϕt(k) = 1− e
∫ T
t
(ρ−k(s,η))ds (4.58)
Furthermore, using our guess for the value function, we obviously have
Jy = −λθrJ
Jyy = λ
2θ2r2J
Jv = −
1
v
J
Jyv = λθr
1
v
J
Jvv =
2
v2
J
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Following our guess for the value function being in C1,2, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation is of the form
ρJ − Jt = max
w,d,a
{
− exp(−λθd) + Jy[ry + η + a− w − d]
+ Jv[ρv + e
−θw+λθa]
+
1
2
Jyyσ
2 +
1
2
Jvvσ
2γ2t
+
1
2
Jηη
σ−2
ht
+ Jyη
1
ht
+ Jyvσ
2γt + Jvη
γt
ht
}
(4.59)
Next, we show that our guess value function necessitates that the principal advises full
action, namely a∗t ≡M for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Lemma 4.2. The recommended action is a∗ =M , namely the right corner is optimal for
the principal.
Proof. By writing the first order condition for wage w and action a from the HJB, we
have the following pair of equations:
−Jy + Jv[−θe
−θw+λθa] +
1
2
Jvvσ
22γγw + Jyvσ
2γw + Jvη
γw
ht
= 0 (4.60)
Jy + Jv[λθe
−θw+λθa] +
1
2
Jaaσ
22γγa + Jyvσ
2γa + Jvη
γa
ht
= 0 (4.61)
Then, our guess for the value function
J = eg(t,η)
e−λθry
v
(4.62)
Jy = −λθre
g(t,η) e
−λθry
v
, (4.63)
we see that Jy is positive, since v is negative.By the relation above,
∂γ
∂w
= −λ∂γ
∂a
> −∂γ
∂a
. Hence, by noting 0 < λ < 1 and by derivatives of the exponential
function with respect to a and w, the first order condition for w binds, whereas the first
order condition for a does not bind. So we have either a = 0 or a =M as optimal actions.
But for a = 0 to be optimal, the right derivative should be less than or equal to 0 at a = 0,
but this can not be the case due to first order condition for a and w above. Similarly, the
right corner’s left derivative is positive, whenever the first order condition for w binds,
14
hence optimal action a∗t =M for all t ∈ [0, T ]. 
Using our guesses for the utility function and the value function and suppressing the
arguments of the functions for simplicity below, we rewrite the HJB equation as follows
ρJ − Jt = max
w,d
{
− e−λθd − λθrJ [ry + η +
log(kv)
λθ
+
log(λθreg(t,η))
λθ
−
log(−v)
λθ
− ry]
−
1
v
J [ρv + kv] +
1
2
λ2θ2r2Jσ2 +
1
2
2
v2
σ2θ2λ2
(
k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ
)2
v2
1
2
Jηη
σ−2
ht
− λθrJη
1
ht
+ λθr
1
v
Jσ2λθ[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ]v −
1
v
Jη
1
ht
λθv[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ]
}
By cancelling the terms and by first order condition on d, i.e. e−λθd = −rJ , we get
ρJ − Jt =
{
rJ − λθJ [η +
log(−k)
λθ
+
log(λθreg(t,η))
λθ
]
− J [ρ+ k] + σ2θ2λ2[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ]2J
+
1
2
Jηη
σ−2
ht
− λθrJη
1
ht
+ λ2θ2σ2rJ [k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ]− λθ
1
ht
[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ]Jη
}
(4.64)
By our guess for the value function, we have
J =
eg(t,η)
v
e−λθry
Jt = gtJ
Jη = gηJ
Hence, the HJB Equation (4.64) reads as
ρ− gt = r − λθ
[
η +
log(−k)
λθ
+
log(λθr)
λθ
+
g(t, η)
λθ
]
− [ρ+ k] + σ2θ2λ2[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ(k)]2
+
1
2
gηη
σ−2
ht
− λθrgη
1
ht
+ λ2θ2σ2r[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ(k)]− λθ
1
ht
[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ(k)]gη (4.65)
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with the terminal condition g(T, ηˆ) = e2(
1−ρ
r
) for all ηˆ ∈ R.
For ease of notation, we introduce the following expressions.
K1(t, ηˆ) = −ρ+ r − λθηˆ − log(−k(t, ηˆ))− log(λθr)− ρ− k(t, η) (4.66)
+ σ2θ2λ2[k(t, ηˆ) +
σ−2
ht
ϕ(k(t, ηˆ))]2 + λ2θ2σ2r[k(t, ηˆ)] (4.67)
K2(t, ηˆ) = −λθr
1
ht
− λθ
1
ht
[k(t, ηˆ) +
σ−2
ht
ϕ(k(t, ηˆ))] (4.68)
K3(t) =
σ−1
ht
(4.69)
By Feynman-Kac, the existence and uniqueness of the PDE above is guaranteed as
g(t, ηˆ) = Eat
[ ∫ T
t
e−(T−s)K1(s, ηˆs)ds+ e
−(T−t)e2
1−ρ
T |Fat
]
, (4.70)
under the action a such that ηˆ is an Ito process driven by the equation
dηˆ = K2(t, ηˆ)dt+K3(t, ηˆt)dW
a
t (4.71)
Moreover, using our guesses for the value function and utility function, we rewrite the
first order condition for w as
λθrJ −
1
v
[−θkv]J +
1
2
2
v2
Jσ22θλv[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ](−θ)2λ2kv (4.72)
+ λθr
1
v
Jσ2θλv[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ] + gη
1
v
Jθ2λ2
kv
ht
= 0 (4.73)
Hence by cancelling v from the equation and dividing by J , the Equation (4.72) reads as
λθr + θk − σ22θλ[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ]θ2λ2k (4.74)
+ λθrσ2θλ[k +
σ−2
ht
ϕ] + gηθ
2λ2
k
ht
= 0. (4.75)
Equation (4.65) and Equation (4.74), k(t, ηˆ) and g(t, ηˆ) are implicitly defined and can be
found numerically.
4.2 Verification Theorem
By the discussion above, we have the following converse relation. Our guess
J(t, y, v, ηˆ) =
eg(t,ηˆ)
v
exp(−λθry) (4.76)
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is a C1,2 function. It also satisfies the HJB equation (4.59)
ρJ − Jt = max
w,d,a
{
− exp(−λθd) + Jy[ry + η + a− w − d]
+ Jv[ρv + e
−θw+λθa]
+
1
2
Jyyσ
2 +
1
2
Jvvσ
2γ2t
+
1
2
Jηη
σ−2
ht
+ Jyη
1
ht
+ Jyvσ
2γt + Jvη
γt
ht
}
with boundary condition
J(T, yT , vT ) = −
exp2(1−ρ
r
)
vT
exp(−λθryT ). (4.77)
Using our guesses for the utility function we also have by the discussion above for optimal
action a∗
e−θw+θλa
∗
= k(t, η)v
−λθw + λθa∗ = log(kv)
−λθw = log(kv)− λθa∗
−w =
log kv
λθ
−M
a∗ − w = M − w =
log(kv)
λθ
−e−λθd = λθrJ
e−λθd = −r
eg(t,ηˆ)
v
e−λθry
−λθd = log(rg(t, ηˆ))− log(−v)− λθry
−d =
log(rj1)
λθ
−
log(−v)
λθ
− ry
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Hence, for each fixed (t, y, v, ηˆ) the expression
max
w,d,a
{
− exp(−λθd) + Jy[ry + η + a− w − d]
+ Jv[ρv + e
−θw+λθa]
+
1
2
Jyyσ
2 +
1
2
Jvvσ
2γ2t
+
1
2
Jηη
σ−2
ht
+ Jyη
1
ht
+ Jyvσ
2γt + Jvη
γt
ht
}
(4.78)
attains its maximum (a∗, w∗, d∗) at
a∗ = M (4.79)
w∗ = M −
log k(t, ηˆa
∗
)v
λθ
(4.80)
d∗ = yr −
log(−v)
λθ
−
log(r)
λθ
−
g(t, ηˆa
∗
)
λθ
, (4.81)
where the functions g(t, ηˆ) and k(t, ηˆ) are determined by Equation (4.74) and Equation
(4.65). Hence, Equation (4.76) is indeed the solution of the HJB Equation (4.78) and we
conclude the verification theorem.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a principal-agent problem with moral hazard. Contrary to
the mainstream, where the principal is assumed to be risk-neutral, we have assumed that
both the principal and the agent have exponential utility as in Equation (2.4), and they
are risk-averse with the same risk awareness level λ as in [20]. We take also an unknown
endogenous learning term representing the unknown quality of the agent into account,
which is revealed as time passes by. We see that both parties agree on a contract, where
the agent gives full effort from beginning until the finite horizon T . Full effort of the agent
in the optimal contract is also observed in [13], where the authors assumed the principal
to be risk-neutral. Hence, we see that the risk-awareness level of the principal does not
affect a role in the agent’s actual effort in the contract, but only the agent’s utility is
determinant in that respect. The optimality of the right corner of the admissible action
interval of the agent as to be seen in Lemma 4.2 is due to the specific nature of the utility
function chosen in Equation (2.4). Changing the utility function of the agent would cause
18
the arguments in Lemma 4.2 would not hold anymore. In that case, one usually assumes
that the optimal effort is in the interior of the effort interval. On the other hand, we
see that the payments to the agents in terms of wages and dividends are affected by the
posterior belief on the unknown quality of the agent ηˆ, as well as on the risk-awareness
λ of the principal as to be seen in the Equations (4.79), (4.80) and (4.81). However, we
can not conclude that there is a direct negative effect on the payment to the agent due
to the nonlinear nature of the parameters. We further note that since the uncertainty on
quality of the agent decreases as to be seen in Equation (2.2), its effect on the dynamics
of the problem decreases as time t passes.
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